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SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS MODELS FOR NSSMS AND 505~15 
1. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study is to develop analytical system effectiveness 
models for different configurations of NSSMS and SDSMS systems that 
provide equations for computing the probability that a specific configuration 
of an NSSMS or SDSMS system will kill a defined target. These models 
account for elapsed time since mission deployment, mission engagement 
time, system operational availability, dependability and capability, and 
different states of system degradation in which the mission objecth·e may be 
attempted. The general form of these models are patterned after the models 
deYeloped by the Weapons System Effectiveness Industrial Advisory 
Committee (WSEIAC) [see Reference 5). The data sources needed to compute 
1'5~1S5 System Effectiveness Yalues against a defined target threat using 
these models are 
a) MRDB ~ata base (NWAC, Corona), 
b) selected results from Performance Analysis (NWAC, Corona) ·where 
applicable 
c) results of selected digital computer simulation runs (~AWC, China 
Lake), 
d) missile command at launch error data for selected fault codes (~SV\'C-
PHD), and 
e) data for estimating failure rates of selected faults. 
A few additional lines of code may be needed to supplement one of the 
existing simulation programs at NAWC, China Lake. 
l 
The models rely heavily on use of the extensive BIT of the NSSMS, 
existing databases and computer pro~:ams and the knowledge base of 
personnel at all of the Na,·a l activities cited abO\·e. 
In the process of computing the 1'S5~15 system effectiveness value using 
these models, the probability of killing a defined target must be computed 
when a missile is fired with the GO display on the FOC or RSC is lighted 
amber for specific fault codes. Knowledge of this probability of kill may be 
very useful to the ship's Captain in some engagement scenarios. For some 
fault codes, this kill probability could al:-o C'e computed when the GO button is 
lighted red . These system effectiveness co:nputations must be done using the 
MRDB data base at N\'\' AC, the comp~te: simulation programs like those in 
existence at NAWC, China Lake, and in some cases, supplemented with 
performance analysis information generated at ~WAC. 
2. SYSTEM CONFIGURATIOt\S A~D ~10DES OF OPERATION 
The systems modeled in this effo;: a:e the NSS~1S with one and two 
directors and the 5D5~15 with one a:1d h,·o directors. The first model 
addresses the NSS~1S ,,·ith one director. T:ie basic subsvstems of the ~55~1S 
are given in Appendix B, Figure 1-0-2.4.2. Figure Bl in Appendix B is a 
reliability block diagram for nearly all of !he KSSMS ~1K57 ~10D 2 system 
components. Figure 1-0-6 in Appendix B r:ovides a listing of the eight major 
functions and their subiunctions and the system hardware units involved in 
each subfunction . References 1 and 2 i:i Appendix A provide extensive 
explanation of the ~55~15 system, its operation, fault identifications and 
codes, debugging and maintenance procedures . Table 5-0-3.3 in Reference 2 





function affected, and narrated descriptions for each cause. The descriptions 
of some of these faults recommend alternative modes of operation of the 
system. Lighted PBls alert the FOC and RSC operators of these system faults. 
Table 5-0-3.3 provides a means for determining hardware faults that will 
cause degradations in the system performance. Appendix C pro\'ides selected 
pages from Table 5-0-3.3 . 
Figure 3-1 in Appendix B displays modes of operation for the NSSMS. 
3. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS J\1ODEL FOR NSSMS MK57 MOD 2 
3.1 System Description and Assumptions 
It is assumed that a search radar external to NSSMS ,,·ill be used to 
perform the target search, detection, evaluation and designation functions-
except that the LLLTV system will be used for search purposes throughout the 
engagement scenarios, and the ~SSMS system will be ready to receive a target 
designation from an EDS given the ~SSMS is in any one of the system status 
states described later in this report. This model also assumes that the EDS 
stays up throughout the mission and is ah\·ays capable of ?erforming the 
abo\'e-named four functions. 
3.2 System States of Operation 
The concept of a system readiness state is key to the ceYelopment of 
system effectiveness models. The description of a specific system readiness 
state would include a listing of all the existing faults in the system that 
significantly affect the capability of the system to perform its mission . A 
system state is a description of degradation in system capability (including no 
degradation) in a manner that associated malfunctioning equipment can be 
identified . Two system states (modes of operation) explicitly discussed in 
3 
Reference 3 are the computer complex casualty (CCC) state and the slaved 
illuminator (SI) state . Table 5-0-3.3 of Refere:1ce 2 (~ee Ap 1endix C} S'L!ggests -. 
that there may be more system sta tes than those associated with CCC or SI 
mode of operation that significantly degrade system .:apability which might be 
of interest for system effectiveness modeling . This table lists 135 system faults 
by an octal code number that either degrade the system (even number) or 
which is a NO GO (odd number) fault for the system . An even numbered 
fault lights the system GO disp lay on the FOC panel in amber color; an odd 
numbered fault results in a red GO display . There a:e 60 odd numbered fault 
codes. Three of these even num bered fault codes a:e used to define system 
states in this study . A key considera~ion i:1 delineat ~:1g system states is to do 
so in a manner so that the corresponding system ca?ability , availability and 
dependability values can be compu ted with existing data bases and computer 
simulat ion resources. A system readiness state can be defined by providing a 
description of each component , sub.:om?Oncnt or reHab ility block of the 
system in sufficient detail to determine their ab::it ies to perform their 
functions. Example descriptions are: 
a) "all up" : same meaning as in definition of Ao :n ~1RDB documents 
b) "up except fault code XXX": can pe:io::n all esse:1tial functions except 
that function described in fault code XXX in Reference 2. 
c) "down": cannot perform critical function. 
One consideration in defin ing system rcacE:1ess s:ates is tv start in a:1 "all 
up" total system state and then look for degradatio:-,s in the components or 
blocks that are unlikely to affect the missile commands gi\-en to the missile at 
launch . Degradation in the FOC is a prime candidate . Allowing for these 





effectiveness. Another consideration is to look for degradations to the "all 
up" system readiness state that cause errors in the missile commands at 
launch, such as range values, which are likely to have an adverse affect on 
kill probability and for which the kill probability could be estimated using 
existing computer simulation programs and data bases. Degradations due to 
fault codes 100, 106 and 112 appear to be such degradations (see Appendix C). 
The fire control system continuously supplies the following missile 
commands to the missile: 
a. Seeker Antenna (Head: Aim (pitch and yaw) 
b. English Bias 
c. Sweep Select 
d. Sweep control 
e . Video Inject 
f. Range at Launch 
' 
g. Channel Designate/HOH 
Reference 3 (pages 6-7) pro\'ides a discussion of these missile commands. 
3.3 Mission Time Parameters 
The SE models de\'eloped in this report are time dependent. They 
accommodate two types of mission times which are 
To: Elapsed time since mission deployment 
t: search-thru-launch (STL) time 
STL is a subset of mission deployment time, T. During STL time targets are 
being actively sought, e,•aluated, tracked and designated by the EDS and the 
):SSMS. It is assumed in this report that maintenance actions (of 
significance) cannot be taken during STL time. 
5 
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Figure 1 
During STL time, the system may transition from system state S; to system 
state S; if degradations occur that cause this transition. The NSSMS system 
may begin the engagement scenario at time To in any one of the system states , 
although the probability of doing so (operational availability of that system 
state) may be quite small. 
3.4 Description of System States, S; 
Seven system readiness states will be used in this model. Their 
descriptions follow : 
S1: All up. 
S.2: All up except fault code 100: transmitter power output degraded (affects 
range trackmg) . 
53: All up except fault code 106: SDP range signal degraded (affects range 
trackmg) . 
5.;: All up except fault code 112: range deviation too large. 
55: All up except FOC which has only control power sufficient to assign , 
tune and fire missiles in a normal manner . 
56: All up except SOP or receiver: slaved illuminator mode (SI). 
Si: All up except computer or SDC: computer complex casualtv mode ~oo. . 
Table 3.1 shows system configuration and degraded components for each 
system state . 
The following two notes from paragraph 3.3 .1.2.1 of Reference 3 are 







SYSTEM STATE ACTIVE COMPONENTS DURING ENGAGEMENT 
StJBSYSTEM (5) 
COMPO~El\'T (C) SYSTE.\1 STATE #s 
# SUBCOMPONEJ\'T (SC) 1 2 3 4 s 6 ' S: GMFCS 
1 C: Comptr • 
2 C: SDC • 
3 C: FOC • 
C: Radar Set 
4 SC: SOP • • 
5 SC: RSC 
Director Group 
6 SC: Dir Ctrl 
7 SC: Oar/Ren • • 
8 SC: Dir/Les!-Ren 
XmtrGrouo 
9 SC: Amp Osc CPhl 
10 SC: Amo Osc (Stlw) 
11 SC: Amo Ose <Radl • • 
12 SC: Cont Mon <Ph> 
13 SC: Cont Mon CStriv> 
14 SC: Cont Mon CRad) • 
15 SC: Static Frea Conv <Ph> 
16 SC: Static Frea ConY (Sttiv) 
17 SC: Static Frea Conv <Radl • • 
18 SC: Cooler 
19 C: LLTV 
20 C: SEAT N N N N N 
5: GMLS 
21 C: Lehr 
22 C: Lehr Ctrl (W /Po wer> 
23 C: Lehr Ctrl CL/Power) 
24 C: MIC 
25 C: Pv.TSuo 
26 C: Loader N 1\: !\: ~ N N N .,-_, C: ocu N N N N N N N 
26 S: Missilt'$•7M 
•: Candidate for degradation; N: not needed for engagement; blank : is 
needed for engagement 
3.3.1.2.1 Slaved Illuminator: This submode may be used during loss of 
either the receiver or SOP if there is an elevation reliable external 
designation source, such as another fire control director, a TOT (if 
implemented), or 3-0 search radar. 
7 
NOTE 
Slaved illuminator cannot currently be used with a TAS Track, as that 
track will not have elevation information. And, there is no way to "lie" 
to the system, providing a manual elevation . 
NOTE 
Currently, no digital EDS will send a designation to NSSMS if the system 
is reporting NO GO, i.e. receiver or SOP casualty. In this case Slaved 
Illuminator is not availab le. 
When slaved, the director will follow the external source . SlaYed 
illuminator mode is init iated by the FOC operator . 
3.5 Availability, Dependability, Capability of System States 
The following notation and definitions are used in the SE model. 
AS;: Operational availabilit y of system state S;. 
The probability that all of the "up" subsystems, assemblies, 
components, of the NSSMS system are ready when called upon at any 
po int in time and those other subsystems, assemblies, components that 
ha\'e faUed and caused the system to be in system state i are not ready 
when called upon . 
DS;i Dependability transition probability. 
The probability that the system transitions from state S; to state 51 
during STL time . It is the probability that the necessary failures needed 
to cause this transition occur during STL time. For each i, 2'D5;,j < 1. 
J 
CSp Capability of the system when in state Sj-
The probability that the target will be killed when the salvos size is two ; 
that is, missiles are fired until two are successfully launched . This 
probability involves a launch probability a missile reliability and a kill 
probability. 
A0 ; : The operational availability of block i . 
If up , it is computed in the same manner as described in the RATC 
manual. (Ref. 6). The operational availability of a block that is no t fully 
up will be computed in accordance with MRDB procedures where 






availability analysis . Some descriptions of block ope rational state such 
as "all up except .... " may require special definition of block availability 




Failure 1·ate of block i 
Ri(t) : Reliability of component or block j for a time inten•al of length t. 
Generic term for probability oi target kill. pk : 
pkj(i): The probability that j Seasparrow missiles of a given type will kill a 
defined target given their missile components function as intended 
and given the missile is launched when the NSSMS system is 
operating in system state S;-
p1(i}: Probability of successfully launching i missiles under the doctrine of 
"fire missiles until two missiles are launched successfully" given that 
eight missiles are loaded at the initiation of the firing process . 
R111: The flight reliability of a gi\'en type of Seasparrow missile . It is the 
same for all system states. 
3.6 System Effectiveness Equations for NSSMS MK57 MOD2 (one director) 
The equation for the System Effecth•eness, SE1 of the NSSMS MK57 
Mod 2, given that a target has been designated by an EDS, is the follo,,·ing : 
SE1 =AS1·DS1,1 ·CS1 + AS1·DS1,:?'CS2 + AS1·DS1,3·CS~ + AS1·DS1,4·CS4 
+ AS1·DS1,s-CS5 + AS1 ·DS1.c,CS6 + AS1 ·DS1,1·CS:- + AS2·DS2,2·CS2 
+ AS3·DS3,3·CS3 + AS4·DS.;.4·CS-1 ~ AS5·DSs ,s·CS~ + AS6·D56,6·CS6 (3.1 ) 
+ AS7· DS- 7-CS-,, I 
(Plus more terms involving other transitions 51 to S1 if the associated DSi,j are 
significantly large .) 
Only the terms DS;.j, j = 2. 3, ... , i in equation ' 3.1) should be included for 
which DSi.j are sufficiently large . 
Clearly the equation for SE1 depends on the definition of system states . 
System state 56 may not be a \'iable state for this system if TAS is the only EDS 
a\ ·ailable. It would be a viable system state if TAS is the principal EDS and an 
clct•ation reliable EDS such as own ships 3-0 search radar, another fire 
control director, or a target designation tr~nsmi~ter {TOT) were a\'ailable . 
9 
None of the Spruance class destroyers are rigged with TDT capability to the 
NSSMS and the ~SSMS MK57 M0D2 onJy has one director . 
System states 52, 53 and 54 all invo]ve a fault that affects radar range 
tracking accuracy. Each of these faults may result in an error in the Range At 
Launch missile command given to the missile at time of launch . Errors in 
the range command (relative to the true target range) may have significant 
effect on kill probability. If the missile is fired with any one of these 
associated faults present (100, 106 or 112) the corresponding kiJl probability , 
pk, must be known in order to compute the ASi'DSi,tCS j terms, since CSi is a 
function of pk. Kill probabilities associated with command launch range 
errors can be estimated by exercising the Modu lar Sparrow Guida nce System 
Simulation (MSGSS) program developed at Na\·a l Air \.Varfare Center , Ch ina 
Lake, CA . It is a Sparrow missile (AZM/RIM-7MIP) six degree of freedom 
digital computer simulation . See Appendi x D for additional description of 
how this may be done . 
If it is determined that either of the two fault codes, 106, 112, introduces 
nearly equal values of range errors into the Range at Launch missile 
command, then it would be appropriate to combine system states 53 and 54 
I I I 
into one system state, say 5
3







In order to run the MSGSS program to compute the pkj(i), j = 2, 3, 4, the 
range error values have to be given as inputs to each simulation run . This 
means that the actual range errors must be assigned \·alues or their 
probability distribution must be given and the actual range error values 
randomly generated from this probability distribution for each simulation . If 






the miss distance within a Critical Miss Distance (CMD) geometry for the 
defined target, then pkj(i) = N/100 . If the CMD \'ector ,·a]ues are not a,·ail;ible 
then the Naval Air vVarfare Center Spa-rrow Lethality Analysis endgame 
program could be run for each of the simulations to determine a 
corresponding kill or no kill . 
The MSGSS simulation runs close to real time, so the major cost in 
making multiple runs may be in the program setup; i.e., entering the input 
parameters needed to run the program and administrati\'e costs. 
COMPUTATION OF A Sr DS1,rCS1 
Since 51 is the "all up" system state AS1 = A0 , the operational availability 
of the 1':SSMS system, that is 
28 
AS1 = TI Aoi 
i=l 
(3.2) 
where index i refer~ to component or subcomponent i in Table 3.1, This table 
is a breakdown of the J\:SSMS system in almost the same manner as Figure 
Bl in Appendix B. !\ot a11 of the 28 components are needed during 
engagement, but they all need to be considered for a\'ailability to ensu ·re all 
maintenance can be performed . 
It is plausible to compute the Aoi ,•a]ues in one oi two ways depending on 
the time between deployment and the time at which the engagement process 
begins. This lapsed time, To, in Figure 1 will determine if a steady state 
availability Aoi will be used or if the a\'ailability at beginning of engagement 
should be determ ined by another method such as 
A~i(To) = Aoi + (1- A0; )c-P·i+µ, )To (3.3) 
1l 
where A.i" = 1 /MTBFi and µi = 1 /MDTi 
and Aoi = MTBFi/(MTBFi + MDTj}. 
Factors Ao2s in Equation 3.2 and CS1 in Equation 3.1 need further 
discussion. 
Factor Ao2s pertains to missile availability. If the mission salvo size is 2 
then at least 2 missiles must be ready . Of those that are ready at least two 
must launch successfully. Suppose the term sci is given by 
csi = PL1(ilr}pk1(i)R~ 
where pu (i Ir) is the probability that i of the r ready missiles will launch 
successfully and pk1(i) is the probability of killing the target with i successfully 
launched missiles when the system is operating in state 51. Exact methods for 
, 
computing system effectiveness would involve CS1 for each case of r = 2, 3, ... , 
8, ready missiles and j = 1, 2, . .. , r successfully launched missiles. These 
computations ,,·ould involve double summations and are overly complex for 
the added accuracy obtained and the relath·e accuracy of the data . 
Consequently it is proposed that the Ao2s term denote the probability tl1at all 
eight missiles are loaded at the beginning of an engagement. 
To compute CS1, let p denote the probability that a fired missile launches 
successfully and suppose that missiles are fired until two are successfully 
launched. Under this doctrine it is also possible to launch only O or 1 missiles 
successfully. Let N2 denote the number of trials (missiles fired) until the 
second successful is launched . Then N2 S 8 corresponds to launching two 
missiles successfully. Let 







pL(2) = P(S = 2) = P(N2 s 8) = 1-[(1-p) 8 + 8p(1-pf). (3.5) 
Also 
pt(l) = P(S = 1) = Bp(1-p)7. (3.6) 
Then 
C'S1 = PL(l)pk1(1)Rm+PL(2)(pk 1(2)R;n+2pk 1(1)Rm(l-Rm)) (3.7) 
where pk1 (i) is the probability of killing the target when i missiles are 
successfully launched when the system is operating in state 51. That is 
CS1 = pk1(1)(8p(l-p) 7)Rm + (1 - { (1 -p)8 + 8p(I - p)7 J)(Jilmpk1(2) + 2pk1(l)Rm(l -Rm)) (3.8) 
The pk1 (1) and pk1 (2) terms can be determined using data from actual 
NS!\15S firings in an "all up" system state when the targets are similar to the 
defined target. Ii sufficient data is not available then pk1 (1) and pk1 (2) will 
have to be determined from :\TAWC MSGSS Sparrow guidance and endgame 
simulation analysis and perhaps other information from performance 
analyses at N\.\1 AC. 
Assuming that two successfully launched missiles are statistically 
independent and are launched with a relatively large time interval than 
pk1 (2) might be computed from 
pk1 (2) = l-C1-pk1 (1))2. (3.9) 
The end game simulations can be run for the case of two missiles pursuing 
one target and these simulations are likely a better ,,·ay to compute pk 1(2). 
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The computation of p from data could be done using the formula p = SL/ l\ 'L 
where SL and NL are the number of succes!=-ful Seasparrow launches in a total 
of Nt launches . 
The factor D51,1 is the probability that all of those up components and 
subcomponents in state 51 needed to perform the mission remain up during 
the length of the engagement time t (search through launch (STL) in Figure 1) 
Let 11 denote the set of indices for those components which are needed during 
the engagement time. Then 
DS11 = TI e-i.it i = TI R;(t;) (3.10) 
i in 11 i in h 
where ti = tor li = t·Df i and Df i is the demand factor for component i. For this 
system state, the components that could be excluded during the engagement 
time are the following : 
INDEX XAME 




The Xmtr cooler is a debatable item. If t < 24 hours then it may not be needed . 
But if its reliability for a 24 hour period is nearly one then it will not make 







COM PUT A TI ON OF D51,;, j = 2, 3, .•• , 7 
For transition to system state 52 (j = 2), the reliability blocks that could 
I I I 
cause fault code 100 appear to be blocks 11 or 14 or 17. Let A11, i..14, and A17 
denote the failure rates of the components or subblock of components in 
blocks 11, 14 and 17, respectively that could cause the degradation described in 
fault code 100 to occur; that is to transition to systemstate 52. These failure 
rates are determined by the definition of state 52 which the system is 
transitioning into; i.e. by the subcomponents that cause fault code 100. 
Therefore they should be indexed in a manner that reflects system state 52. 




4'2) and ;..; i(2). We choose to 
lea\'e this indexing feature out howe\'er to keep the notation to a minimum 
in the equations that follow. Assuming independence among these failures 
and that any one such failure could cause the fault code 100 degradation, the 
probability, Q1,2Ct), that only this degradation docs occur during the 
engagement time in these three blocks is 
Q1,2U) = {1-exp(-t(i.;1 + i.;.i + i.;7 }}R1,2(t) (3.11) 
where R1,2(t) is the probability that all of the remaining components in these 
three blocks survive the time length t. Then 
D51,2 = exp(i.11tn + i.14t14 + J.17t17 }D51,1 · Q1,2(t). (3.12) 
Note that the first factor on the right-hand side of equation (3.12) has no 
negative sign in the exponent. In equation (3.12) the product group 
R11Ct11)R14(t14)R17(t17) in 051,1 is divided out by this first factor and is 
replaced by Q1,2(t). This feature is present in· all of the following equations for 
15 
the 051,j• The equation for CS2 has the same form as that in Equation 3 .6 but 
with pk1(i) replaced by pk,2(i) whic h is the probability of missiles killing the 
target when launched while in system state 2. The quantity pk2(i) will likely 
have to be determined from computer simulations . We assume that missile 
reliability, Rm, remains the same for all system states. 
For transmission to system state S3, j = 3, only reliability block 4 is 
involved. Therefore 
Q1,3(t) = ( 1 - e -i.~ t )Ri,3 (t) (3.13) 
where i.4 = i..4 (3) is the failure rate of the subgroup of block 4 (the SOP) that 
causes the 106 fault code degradation and R1,3(t) is the probability that the 
remaining subgroup of block 4 survives time t. Then 
D51,3 = e+i. 4t4 DS1,1Q1,3(t). (3.14) 
CS3 is gi\'en by Equation 3.8 wi th pk1(i), rep lace by pk3(i). 
For transition to system state S,a, blocks 7, 11, 14 and 17 are candidate 
blocks that could participate in the fault code 112 degradation. , ,vith failure 
f I 
rates "-i = i~i(4), i = 7, 11, 14, 17 defined in a manner similar to that gh'en 
Pre\'ious lv • I 
Q1,4 (t) = { 1 -exp(-t( it~ + J.;1 + ).;4 + i.; 7 ))}R1.4 (t) (3.15) 
and 
D.5J,4 = exp(J.7t7 + l11t11 + i.14t14 + il11t1i )DS1,1Q1,4(t) . (3.16) 







For transition to system state Ss, only block 3 (the FOC) is involved. 
Therefore 
Q1,s(t) = ( 1-e -i~, )Ri,;lt) (3.17) 
and 
DS1,s = e'1.31DS1,1Q1,s(t) {3.18) 
, I I 
where A3 = A3(5) and Q1,5(t) are defined in a manner similar to the Aj and 
Q],j(t) above. 
CS5 is given by Equation 3.8 with pk1 (i) replaced by pks(i) . 
For transition to system state 56 only blocks 4 (the SDP) and 7 (the 
receiver) are invol\'ed. Therefore 
( 
-t().~ +i.~ )] 
Q1,6(t} = 1- e R1,6(t) (3.19) 
I I , t 
where 11.4 = i.4(6), i.7 = i.7(6), and R1,6(t) a:-e defined in a manner similar to . 
the i-.j, and Qq(t) abo,·e. Then 
DS1,6 = c1V-~.,.;·6 )DS1,1Q1,6rt) . .(3.20) 
CS6 is given by Equation 3.8 with pk1 replaced by pk6. It is important to note 
, , , , 
that the values of i.4, an i.7 for this degradation may differ from the ,.4, an ,.7 
values leading to the transition for state 51 to S3 and from state 51 to S• 
respectively. System state 56 is the slaved muminator mode . The ability to 
track and illuminate the target adequately and the errors in the missile 
commands at launch depend greatly on the 3-D radar used to replace the 
17 
defective director. This means that the input parameters for the compute 
simulations for generating a pk may have to be radar dependent . 
For transition to system sate 57, one or both of blocks 1 and 2 are involved 
I ~ 
in a significant way. Thi s state is the computer complex causalty sta te. If i..1 = 
I I I 
l.1 (7), and l.2 = A. 2 (7} denote the failure rates of components 1 and 2 
respectively associated with degradations of the type that force the FOC or 
RSC opera tor to go to the CCC mode then 
( 
-t(J.; +i.~)) 
Q1,1(t) = 1-e R1,i(t) (3.21) 
and 
DS1,i = et().1+i.i)DS1,1Q1,7(t). (3.22) 
As in all of the above transitions the equation for CS7 is the same as for CS in 
Equation 3.8 with pk1 (i) replaced with pk7(i). That is 
CS7 "'pk7(1)(8p(I - p)7)Rrn +( I - {(I • p)8 + 8p(l - p)7})(Ripk 7(2) + 2pk7(l)Rm(l - Rm)) (3 .23) 
The remaining terms in Equation 3.1 for SE1 are of the form ASrDSj ,j"CSj, 
j = 2, 3, . .. , 7. Since these states Sj ha,·e greater degradation than state 51, the ir 
a\'ailability values ASj will likely be smaller than AS1 if the maintenance 
programs are effective . AS; is the probability that the NSSMS is in state Sj at 
the start of an engagement . These system state a,•ailabilities can be computed 
in much the same manner that AS1 = Ao is computed. For example, let Dj be 
I 
the index set of blocks that are in a degraded state in system state S;, and Di be 
the index set for those blocks not in a degraded state. Then an approximate 




AS/=( TI1oill-.. TI (1-A:;(j))) 




where the first and second products are taken over the index set D; and Dj 
, 
respectively and Aoi (j) is the probability that block i is in its state of 
degradation defined by system state S; at the beginning of an engagement. 
, 
The term AOi(j) could be defined by 
A~i(j)=[ .. TIA:iJu)JAoi(oj(i)) 
1 m D;(i } 
(3.25) 
. 
where Aoid(j) is the probability that subcomponent d of block i is in its . 
degraded state defined by system state Sj and AoiCDi<i>) is the availability of that 
part of block i excluding the subcomponents in Dj(i); i.e. the "all up" 
a\'ailability of this part of block i. The subscript id denotes the dth 
subcomponent in block i that is degraded for this state Sj, D;m is the index set 
, 
of degraded subcomponents and Dj<D is the index set for nondegraded 
subcompone~ts. The first product is taken O\'er all din D;m-
An alternati\'e and more accurate equation for AS; is 





a) Di is the index set for all subcomponents in all blocks anyone of whose 
individual degradations results in system state Sj, 
b) A~d is the probability that subcomponent d is in its degraded state 






) is the 1'all up" a\'ailability of the entire NSSMS system l~ss 
• 
those subcomponents in D; . 
. 
An alternative equation for AOi(j) would be 
• N ·(j) 
A (") l Oi J - N {3.26) 
where Nj(j) denotes the number of times block i is in the degraded mode 
defined by system state S; at the start of an "engagement " and N is the total 
number of "engagements ." Still another equation may be 
, Ti(j) 
AOi(j) -rST (3.27) 
where Ti(j) is the total stress time block i is in degraded mode defined by 
system state Sj and TST is the total stress time for block i. 
Collecting data needed to enable computations using Equations 3.26 or 
3.27 may be quite feasible because they are tied to highly \'isible e\'ents ; i.e., 
PBis light up. The TST may be a random sample from all of the stress time 
for block i so that the crew is recording Ti(j) for designated periods of time . 
This may be feasible if the number of fa ult codes for which this is done is 
small per ship . The fault codes could be divided among ships (randomly) to 
facilitate this . 
~ot all of the ASj may be worth computing because they are known to be 
quite small. This may be true for AS5, AS6 and AS7 for example . On the 
other hand these events are so highly visible that it may be easy to obtain data 





Equations that should give close approximations to the DSj,j values can be 
written using notions already developed for the transition cases. Let Ij denote 
the index set of all components that must remain working throughout the 
• 
engagement for the system to remain in system state Sj. Let ¾ be the 
, 
intersection of the two sets I; and D;· Then 
DSj,j = (. f!!;(t})Rj,j(t). 
, ml; 
(3.28) 
Recall that Rj,j(t) is the probability that all of the non-degraded 
subcomponents of the degraded blocks in state Sj live throughout the 
engagement. 
The equations for the CS; are the same as before and given in Equation 3.8 
with pk1 (i) replaced by pkj(i). 
As an example of all of the above consider system state S,2. For this state 
D2 = {11, 14, 17} 
D; = {integers x: 1 $ x $ 28,x .e 11, 14, 17} 
and 
AS2 =[ I1A)1- II (1-A:1(2))) 
i in D2 J , 1n D2 
where for i = 11, 14, 17. 
, (comp #i would cause failure mode 100 to ] 
AOi(2)=P light up a: the sta:t of an engagement; i.e., at 
random time or hme T 0 
21 
(3.29) 
and for i ~ 11, 14, 17 
Aoi = operational availatiility (t,y MRDB). 
If 
Ij = (integers 5: 1 s; x S 28; x ~ 16, 20, 26, 27) 
then 
. , 
~ = lj f"'I D2 = (1, 2, ... , 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, ... , 25, 28} 
and 
D52,2 = [ . ;n :-1·i']R2,2(t) 
I in I; 
{3.30) 
'"·here i.2s denotes the failure rate of all S missiles in the launcher. All ).i and 
the R1 ,2(t) factor can be computed using 1'1RDB data and methods. The 
equation for CS2 is 
CS2 =pk2(1)(8 p(l •p) 7)Rm+(1 -{(1-p) 8 +8p(1-p) 7l)(R2mPk2(2)+2pki(l}Rm(l •Rm)) (3.31} 
where pk2(1) and pk2(2) are obtained from computer simulations. Then 
Equations 3 .29, 3.30, and 3.31 are combined to form the product AS2·DS2,2·CS2. 
The remaining terms of SE1 can be computed in the same manner. 
4. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS l\10DEL AND EQUATIONS FOR NSMSS 
MK57 MOD3 (TWO DIRECTORS) 
The equations for the System Effecth-eness i SE2, of the NSS~15 MK57 






developed in this section. The same se,·en system operating states are used as 
defined in Section 3.4 and Table 3.1 
With a two-director system it is possible to have exactly one or exactly two 
directors available at the beginning of an engagement scenario with a defined 
target. The transition probability DSi,j will depend on the number of directors 
that are available at the beginning of the engagement . The following new 
concepts are needed when two directors are available at the beginning of the 
engagement. The operating state of the FCS that gives the missile commands 
to the missile at time of launch depends on the Firing Doctrine (FDOC) . The 
transition probabilities (corresponding to the DSi ,j) when two directors are 
both all up at the starf of the an engagement will be defined for the ~following 
tv-;oFDOC. 
FDOCI: Only change to the second director if the SI casualty mode (56) on 
the current director is called for . Stay with the current director 
in all other 6 system states . 
FDOC II : Change to the second director ,,·hen the current director enters 
system states 52, 53, S-1 or So. 
Let D51,j(k) denote the probability that the system desginated to the target 
at time of launch is in state Sj given the system with k directors is all up .at the 
sta rt of the engagement scenario . First note that D51}1) = D511 as defined in 
Section 3.4 . The definitions of DS1,j(2) for DSOC I and DSOCII are as folloh 'S 
where current director is the director desginated to the target at start of 
engagement. 
For FDOC I, j = 2, 3, 4 
05 1 . (2): Given the NSSMS with 2 FCs is all up at start of engagement, the 
,J probability that the system with current director transitions to 
system state Sj and remains in that state for the rest of the 
engagement. 
23 
For FDOC II, j = 2, 3, 4 
D51 . (2): Given the N55MS with 2 FCs is all up at start of engagement, the 
•I probability that the system with current director transit ions out 
of state 1 and switch to second FCS is made and the system with 
second director active transitions to state Sj before time at 
launch. 
For FDOC I and II, j = 5 
D5 1,5(2): Given the NSSMS with 2 FCs is all up at start of engagement , the probability that at least one of the 2 FCS will be up at time of 
launch ana the FOC degrades to the condition defined by system 
state 55. 
For FDOC I and II, j = 6 
D51 j (2): Given the NSSMS with 2 FCs is all up at start of engagement, the ' probability that either the SOP or receiver in both FCS go to 
down state during the engagement time. 
Some of the equations for the 05 1,i (2) can be written in terms of the DS;. J 
defined in Section 3.4. 
Table 3.2 gives approximate equations for OS1,j (2) in terms of DS.,., ior 
each FDOC where possible . 
TABLE3.2 
APPROXIMATE EXPRESSIONS FOR osl,j (2) FOR FDOC J AND FDOC II 
STATE #j FAULT CODE FDOCI FDOCII 
1 all up 051,1 1-(1-051,1)2 
2 100 051,2 Cl-OS1,1)OS1,2 ~O 
3 106 051,3 Cl-!)S1,1 )051.3 =0 
4 112 051,4 Cl-OS1,1)OS1,4 =0 
5 FOC .. .. 
6 SI .. .. 
7 CCC .. • 




For example from Table 3.2 under FDOC I, D5 1,2(2) = D5 1,2 and under 
FOOC Il, D51,1(2) = 1 - (1-D5 1,1)2. 
An approximate equation for D5 1,5(2) is 
D51,5(2) = Q1,5(t)(1-(1-e'·
31D511 )2) 
where 0 1,s(t) is defined in Equation 3.17. 
An approximate equation for D51,6(2) is 
D51,6(2) = ( Ql,6(1) n 1-( 1-,,(l.4 •l.7 )Dsn n 
where Q1,6(t) is defined in Equation 3.20 . 
An approximate equation for D5 1,;(2) is 
D5 1,7 (2) = Q1,; ( t)( 1 -( 1 - ,,i;., •'-2lv Sn f J 
where Q1,7(t) is defined in Equation 3.21. 




To compute the a\·ailability of two all up systems at start of engagement 
some new notation is needed . Let 
and 
Aoc = Ao1 · An~ · A03 
20 
AoFC = flAoi 
i=4 
28 
AoL = TIAoi 
i-=21 
2-:i 
AoFCj = P(an FCS is in State Sj at start of engagement), j = 2, 3, 4, 6, 
where Aoi are the operationa] a\'aiJabilities computed by ~1RDB methods 
except that A2s is the probability that all 8 missiles are loaded at beginning of 
the engagement. Then 
AS 1(2FC) = P(Syste m with two FCS is all up at time of engagement) 
= AS1·AoFC (4.4) 
where AS1 is defined by Equation 3.3. Also 
(
System with two FCs has one FCS up ) 
AS1 ·(lFC) = P one FCS down and all other components up (4.5) 
= 2AS1. (1-.'.oF c) 
Table 3.3 gives a descr iption of all of the initial systems states at start of 
engagement for which equations for System Effectiveness will be deve loped . 
The a\·ailabilities for each of the other possible initial system states will be 
assigned the \'alue zero , because their likelihood of occurring is thought to be 
\'ery smal l. 
TABLE 3.3 
DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE INITIAL ST A TES 
State 4' ASj(k) Description of System 
j = 2, 3, 4, 6 ASjOFC) One FCS in S; and other FCS all up 
i = 5, 7 AS;(2FC) Both FCS all up 
From Table 3.3 
ASj(lFC) = 2ASj' AOFC j = 2, 3, 4, 6 







AS7(2FC) = AS7·AoFC 
where ASj is defined in Equation 3.24 or 3.24A. 
Let the "necessary" FCS reliability be given by 
17 
RFc(t) = R19(t) IlRiCt) 
i=4 
Note that this definition omits the transmitter cooler. Let 
( 
FOC is in state 55, at least one FC is all up ) 
DS--(2} = p and rest of needed system is up at time of launch 
~~ . . s given system starts engagement m state 5. 
2 ( ., ) 26 








at least one FC is all up and rest of needed system] 
DSi7(2) = p t? remain in state 7 is up at tim~ of launch 
g1\'en system starts engagement m state S, . 
( 
., 26 




The equation for the approximate Yalue of the System Effecti\'eness, SE2, of 
the XSSMS, MK57 MOD3 system is 
7 7 
sE2 = I,As 1(1Fc)-DSi,i -csj + IAS 1(2FC)•Ds;,/2) -csi 
j=l j=1 (4.12) 
+ 2,ASj(lFC)·DS;,;-CSj + IASj(2FC) ·DS;,;(2) ·CS; 
j=2,3,4,6 j=5,7 . 
27 
5. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS MODELS FOR SDSMS 
(NSMSS WITH TAS) 
The System Effectiveness equations SE1 and SE2in Equations 3.1 and 4.12 
respectively are probabilities that are conditioned on the EDS being in a 
sufficiently "all up " state to perform all of its functions-especially to provide 
accurate target designations to NSSMS. Degradations in components or 
blocks of the T AS may cause errors in the missile commands gh•en to the 
missile at time of launch. If this is the case, and these degradations can be 
determ ined and the extent of their induced missile command errors defined, 
either determin istically or stochastica Hy, then additional system states could 
be defined and the methods developed in the previous sections of this report 
could be used to develop corresponding System Effectiveness equations for 
the SDSMS system . The effect of degradat ion in TAS on the NSSMS system 
will likely depend upon the way TAS is configured with the CDS and 
NS:\15S. There are variations in these configurations across ships. 
The TAS documentation apparently is not nearly as refined as the 
!\'55).15 documentation . For examp le, apparently no documentation exists 
that compare with References 1 and 2. Consequently it may be more labor 
intensive to establish quantitath·e errors in missile command inputs due to 
specific TAS degradations. Additional effort is needed to assess the ,•iability 
and potential benefit of such quantitative error determinations. 
The impact of TAS degradations on NSS:MS may not be that significant 
due to a "filtering" process that may occur in the CDS and CIC. Designation 
data that gets generated when insignificant degradations are present may get 








significant TAS degradations are present may get filtered in the CDS or CIC 
and not passed to NSSMS. This means the likelihood of T AS causing a 
degradation in the SDSMS with respect to NSSMS may be quite small. 
Assuming no significant faulty designation data gets through to NSSMS, 
equations for the System Effectiveness of the SDSMS are the following for 
mod 2 and mod 3 versions of NSMSS respecth•ely . 
SE51 = Ao(TAS)RT(t)SE1 (5.1) 
and 
SEs2 = Ao(TAS)Rr(t)SE2 (5.2) 
where A0 (TAS) is oper~tional a\·ailability of an "all up" TAS system and RT(t) 
is the reliability of the TAS system . 
A reliability block diagram of TAS system is pro\·ided in Appendix B. 
6. RUNNING OFFICIAL J\:SSMS COMPUTER SIMULATIONS 
Section 3 of Reference -1 contains NSPO policies and procedures for 
processing requests for computer runs on NSPO appro\'ed simulation 
programs and the processing of the results through the chain of command 
back to the requesting agency. Section 3 oi Reference 4 is included in 
Appendix D of this report . 
7. IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation of this system effectiveness methodology requires 
input from NSVvC-PHD to identify the components associated with each 
degraded system state and also the corresponding range of errors in the 
missile commands at launch . This will be a one-time input until additional 
degraded states of system operation are identified. A matrix of degraded 
29 
system state descriptions and associa ted components will be prepared as an 
addendum to this report. This matrix should be submitted to NSWC-PHD for 
verification . 
Inputs from NWAC China Lake, or some other activit y with the ability to 
perform fly•out simulations # will be needed to provide Pk values . NATO 
missile type and their missile commands at launch values and the target 
parameters are needed to run the fly-out simulations . For each NATO 
miss ile and target pairing about seven scenarios should be simulated with at 
least 50 replications to obtain Pk Yalues for each scenario. A scenario will be 
determined by a set of values for the missile commands at launch, true range 
at launch, and target illumination . An approximate total of about 2,0:w 
simulation runs per targe t pairing will be needed. Some of these simulation 
runs will require end game ana lysis simulations ·which would be done at 
NAWC China Lake as well. KPS will pro\ •ide descriptions of the simulation 
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APPENDIX C. SELECTED TABLES 
The follm\'ing tables were selected from Reference 2 and provided here to 
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APPENDIX D. USING COf\f PUTER SIMULATION TO ESTIMATE 
PROBABILffi' OF KILL 
The GMFCS continuously supplies the following information to an 
assigned missile: 
a. Seeker Antenna (Head) Aim (pitch and yaw) 
b. English Bias (equal to head aim unless launch is not LOS to predicted 
intercept) 
c. Sweep Select 
d. Sweep Control (neg Ve programming) 
e. Video Inject 
f. Range at Launch 
g. Channel Designate /HOH 
The Head Aim Orders commands position the seeker antenna relative to 
the missile centerline in such a manner that the antenna boresight ,,..,il} be 
pointed at the predicted target position following launch. 
'Cnder most conditions the missile is launched along a line of sight 
to,,·ard the predicted intercept point h, ·ith some super elevation). \·\Then 
nominal launch conditions cannot be met, English bias orders command the 
mis::-ile to maneuver during boost (before target acquisition) in order to co::,e 
to the desired trajectory toward intercept. 
The Range at Launch. Command is used by the missile guidance 
computer to calculate time-to-go which, in turn, is used to determine when 
the missile initiates terminal mode. 
The accuracy of these three input commands will affect the capability of 
the missile to get within a critical miss distance geometry (CMD) of the 
defined target. The G~1FCS can supply inaccuracies in these three data 
Cl 
elements when operating in one or more of the degraded modes . For 
example, when the GMFCS is in system state Sf the GO light on the FOC and 
RSC panels are lighted in amber color. The operators of either these consoles 
can determine the fault by reading the fault code on the PBls on their 
respective panels . The fault code for this system state is 112 which is a percent 
range deviation error fault . If a missile is launched with only this fault 
present, the probability, pkj , of the missile getting with in the C~1D is likely to 
be lower than if the fault were not present. One feasible way to determine 
this probability is through computer simulations of some sort . The Modular 
Sparrow Guidance Syst em Simulat ion, MSGSS, 6-DOF Digital Computer 
Simulation program can be used to estimate pkj whe n the fault is prese n t. 
This is done by input range data for the missile in the same manner it would 
receive it when this fault is present . That is, the range input data to th e 
missile is different from the range input data assigned to the target whe n 
specifying the inputs need to run the simulation program . If the simulations 
are run Nj times and the "miss distance geometry" given by the simulation 
program output is ,,·ithin the C~1D in Sj of these runs then an est imate for 
pki is 
pkj = s1 I N; . 
If the range data actually transmitted to the missile is stochastic ,, ·hen this 
fault is present, then the range input data for the simulat ion runs will be 
generated randomly from the same probability distribution thought to be 
appropriate for the randomness in the actual transmitted range ,·alues . 
t2 
, 
The NA\\'C end game simulations can be run for each of the MSGSS 
runs to determine if a kil1 occur~. Thi~ end game analysis is prob;ibly the best 
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1. As directed at the 51st NATO SEASPARROW Steering Committee 
Meeting, reference (a) initiated an effort to survey existing 
performance assessment models/simulations in the NSSMS technical 
community and to produce a catalog informing the Participating 
Gove=nments about the models and the procedures for their access. 
2. Enclosure (1) documents the survey results and describes 
policies and procedures for utilization of the models and their 
associated technical staffs. These resources are being made 
available for PG use through a coordinated network that will 
enable timely responsiveness to PG analytical study needs. 
3. The NSPO point of contact is COR Svein Solheim, Program 
Element Manager for Performance Assessment. CDR Solheim can be 
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A. Introduction 
B. Policies/Procedures for Model Acceptance into the NSPO Network 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
At the 51st NATO SEASPARROW Steering Conrnittee Meeting in Rome, the 
Committee funded a NSPO effort to survey and catalog models/simulations 
presently held within the NSSHS technical community and to inform the 
Participating Governments (PGs} about these models and the procedures for 
access. This section outlines the NSPO policies and procedures whereby the 
consortium PGs can gain access and use these models, many of which, with 
appropriate adjustments, are capable of providing performance assessments 
of the PGs systems capabil ities against the current and evolving threat. 
The models and capabilities are also valuable to support pre- and post-
exercise test analyses . Many of the models are capable of addressing 
program technical issues , effectiveness, and impacts at various levels of 
technical detail. 
All consortium members are encouraged to use these facilities/ 
capabilities . The NSPO point-of-contact is the Program Element Manager for 
Performance Assessment, who may be reached at 703-746-6239; Fax 703-746-
6279. 
Policies and procedures addressed in this section include those for 
submittal of information to gain NSPO approval for participation in the 
models network, as wel l as procedures to gain access for utilization of the 




8. POLICIES/PROCEDURES FOR MODEL ACCEPTANCE INTO THE NSPO NETWORK 
Participation in the NSPO Models Network is gained by providing 
qualification information to the NSPO Performance Assessment Program 
Element Manager that addresses the description of the models/submodels, 
technical sources, verification/validation results, prior uses of the 
model(s), model configuration control and management processes in place at 
the custodian's site, and estimates for cost and schedule responsiveness 
relative to typical studies in which the model is expected to be employed. 
Initial action is to provide NSPO with model information in simplified 
format that covers the data shown in Table 3.B-1. A short form that can be 
completed in a few hours by model-knowledgeable staff is the vehicle (see 
Figure 3.8-1). Receipt of this information will enable NSPO to make a 
determination of the suitability and applicability of the model to PG needs 
and a decision whether to include the model into the NSPO Quick Response 
Models Network. 
In general, applicability is based upon the model being capable of 
conducting "performance assessment" of the system or element of the system, 
completeness/comprehensiveness of its technical content, and validity of 
technical results, and its availability in terms of responsiveness of 




Table 3 .B-1. Information Requested for Initial Submittal of 
Models/Simulations for Entry into the NSPO Quick 
Response Models Network 
1. Model Title 
2. Model Custodian Organization/Address 
3. Point(s)-of-Contact/Te1ephone/Fax number(s) 
4. Model Description 
a. Scope and General Description/Technical Contact/Limitations 
b. Technical Features/Submodels/Block Diagram 
c. Representative Inputs 
d. Representative Outputs 
e. Computer Resource/Program Logic Diagram 
f. Information Basis/Sources of Major Submodels 
5. Description of Typical Scenarios/Studies the Model Applies To 
6. Representative Prior Uses (Study Tit1e/Sponsor/Date(s)) 
7. Hodel Documentation Content and Status 
8. Representative "Ballpark" Cost/Calendar Schedule to set up, run, 
analyze, and report results (conduct a study) for typical studies 




..... 1 •f _ ,., ... 
!Dclud1zlc ac:acmanu 111 rHpoDdanc 
-,Z,EL/SI>Cz:n ..•.ncm StllVlt Dl'OUl.nQII 
ftll. 
114!'0 QUI CZ WPOISE NODILI D1'IDU 
DA:11 -------
a.tun caaplecad f•Di "1th Mf1 act:adlN11u ~ 
IIATO SL\SPAIIOW PIOJECT OPFICE 
IIAVIEA 061 
234S Cry1tal Dr-i,,., kite 210 
Arll111to11, YA 12202 
Atta: hoar- !leeent Kana1er for Perforunca 4'••••••t 
1. NDDEL nnz :. ______________________ _ 
2. CtJSTODL\Jf 01.CAKIV.TIOII: ___________________ _ AJll:IIILSS:: ________________________ _ 
l. N>IRT OF CO!r".ACT: tNa;;g) ((Cpd•) 
<Po,!;iml "1.cll 
4. NDDEl. Dl'lT1>J. OPD.\TIQfW. CI.PAJll.lTr JM.Tt: ____________ _ 
s. NODEL DE.SC1.IPTlON/CEND>.L: SCOP!; naanc:u. JT.\TaltS:. ________ _ 
,. NODEl. l.El'll.SD'IA.nvt n.JOI. USZ:S (S"tWY EJTQlT/SPONSCI.) : ________ _ 
7. VSEll 'S DOCUKD.7ATI0N; STA'roS : _________________ _ 
I , IEPllSEHTATIVE IIODEL OUffU?S (ATTAOI Alm U1'Elt lO) : _________ _ 
t. IUUSDfTAnvE DPUTS UQOIID: ________________ _ 
Figure 3.8-1. Model Information ~Survey Fonn, Sheet l of 2 
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Upon determination of applicability/usability of the proposed mode1, 
NSPO will contact the custodian organization to arrange a m~re detailed on-
site technical information exchange on the model. The on-site visit will 
review survey form inputs and receive detailed technical and functional 
descriptions of the model from the custodian's staff. The NSPO in-depth 
review will also address technical sources used for the submodels and the 
verification/validation of the model. The on-site meeting will 
additionally discuss the custodian's technique for model and data 
configuration management, and review the anticipated costs/response 
schedule estimates for typical studies for which the model could be 
employed. 
Following the on-site visit, the custodian will provide more detailed 
model descriptive information in accordance with approved NSPO catalog 
entry format that is suitab1e for inclusion in the Network Resource Booklet 
(catalog). This process for model/simulation approach is shown in Figure 
3.8·2. Description/Instructions for developing the catalog entry 
description of a custodian ' s analysis capability/model/simulation is given 
in Table 3.B-2. 
Figure 3.8-2. 
en-, I l"DI ---
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Model/Simulation Approval Process for NSPO 
Quick Response Models Network 
r:11 
Table 3.B-2. Instructions for Catalog Entry Description of Analytical 
Capabilities[Hodel!/Simulations 
A. General 
l . Each catalog entry consists of : 
• Executive Sunmary Description 
• Technical Description Overview 
2. Hust be unclassified and contain no proprietary or private data . 
8. Detailed Description 
1. Descriptive title 
2. Exact title as known by the custodian , includ ing version, date, 
etc. 
3. Name of developing/mainta ining organizat ion; address 
4. Management point-of-contact for the model /simulation ; 
telephone/Fax numbers 
5. Technical point-of-contact for the model/simulati on; 
telephone/Fax numbers 
6. Identification of the type of model/simulati on, e .g ., 
performance assessment, effectiveness , etc. 
- Types of prior studies in which the model was used and for 
what purpose. 
7. Computer Hardware/Software Requirements/Facilities Employed 
8. Documentation Status 
9. Summary Description 
a . Functional Details 
- what the model is of 
- what the model does 
- types of inputs 
- types of outputs 
- representative graphics of the output 
b. Technical Details 
block diagram of structure 
- tier zero flow chart 
- list of salient submodels 
c . Model/Submodel Technical Sources 





Organizations whose models/simulations are approved for NSPO Quick 
Response Network utilization are described in the Resource Booklet 
(catalog). Custodians are expected to provide HSPO with change notice 
descriptions of the model in update of their catalog entry periodically or 
upon major upgrade of their capabilities/model features and to retain 




C. POLICIES/PROCEDURES FO  MODEL UTILIZATION TO CONDUCT STUDIES 
The NSPO encourages the PGs to use the performance assessment 
capabilities represented by these analytical/model/simulation facilities 
described in this Resource Booklet (catalog). The capabilities/facilities 
described herein are available via NSPO-coordinated use to conduct studies 
of various types. The NSPO Program Element Manager for Performance 
Assessment will undertake to coordinate PG needs and to employ the models 
on a case-by-case basis. Study efforts using the NSPO network will be 
conducted on a •pay-as-you-go• basis. Figure 3.C-1 describes the procedure 
for using the models network. The NSPO will provide task descriptions in 
written format to initiate custodian task scope/cost/schedule estimates. 
It is anticipated that funding will be provided through already existing 
contract vehicles that NSPO has in-place with each of the custodian 
organizations in order to facilitate quick-response to PG requirements. 
Once task descriptions and deliverables have been agreed upon, the task 
direction will be documented in a form consistent with requirements of the 
in-place contract (e.g., a formal Technical Instruction or Delivery Order 
will be issued). Study results will generally be provided directly to the 
PG customer in the format of technical presentations to minimize response 
delays in disclosing results; however, a formal, documented study report is 
expected to follow to constitute final task delivery. Figure 3.C-1 depicts 
this process. 
:C-14 
• PG APPROACHES NSPO WITH PROBLEM DEFINITION 
- NSPO/PERFORMANCE SSESSMENT PROGRAM ELEMENT MANAGER 
MATCHES APPROPRIATE MODELS/SIMULATIONS O THE PROBLEM 
- DISCUSSES WITH PG THE COST, SCHEDULE, INPUTS NEEDED, 
AND DESIRED OUTPUTS 
• NSPO APPROACHES MODEL CUSTODIANS ( OTIFIES COGNIZANT 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT WHEN ON-NSPO C NTROLLED MODEL) 
- CUSTODIAN (MAY) RECOMMEND (UPGRADED) MODEL/SIMULATION 
AND PROVIDES DESCRIPTION 
- NSPO PERMISSION APPROVES/DISAPPROVES USE OF UPGRADED 
VERSION 
• CUSTODIAN PROVIDES DETAILED COST/SCHEDULE ESTIMATE O 
CONDUCT STUDY 
• PG AUTHORIZES GO-AHEAD VIA NSPO 
• CUSTODIAN PERFORMS BENCHMARK, AND 
- CONDUCTS S UDY 
- PREPARES RESULTS 
• CUSTODIAN OBTAINS PROJECT MANAGEMENT APPROVAL TORELEASE 
INFORMATION 
• CUSTODIAN PRESENTS RESULTS TO PG WITH NSPO 
CONCURRENCE/PARTICIPATION 
• FINAL DELIVERY/FORMAL STUDY REPORT ISSUED BY CUSTODIAN TO 
PG WITH NSPO CONCURRENCE 
Figure 3.C-1. Procedures for Using NSPO Quick Response Models Network 
.t'l 5 
APPENDIX E. ASSUMPTIONS 
This appendix describes assumptions about properties of the l'\SS)IS 
system that affect the accuracy of the equations in this report. 
1. PROBABILITY DISTRIBl1TIO~S 
The same assumptions are made here about the probabi li t.y di stri but ion 
of tbe failure times and repair times of the blocks and components that are 
made in the Readiness Assessment Training course [Ref, 6]. In particular 
all failure times and repair times ha\'e exponential distributions. 
The failure time of the subgroup of components in block i whose failure 
results in a system degradation to state 5. 
J 
is assumed to have an 
exponential distribution \,'ith failure rate ~i ~'-(j). 
I 
This is done 
because the probability of this occurr e nce of this event wi 11 be small and 
e-~it should be a good approximation to this value. The failure rate ~i can 
be 1/~TBFi \.'here MTBFi is the expected failure time of the s ubgroup (i . e.~ 
sub-block) of components that can cause the degradation to state Sj . If the 
reliability block diagram for this degradation event is formed and the 
associated reliabi Ii ty for this subgroup is RSi(t) t then the mean tim e to 
failure of this subgro up is 
IITBF; = J~ RSi( t)dt 
and ~i = 1/MTBF;. 
2. STATISTICAL 11'\DEPE~DE~CE 
Statistical i ndependence is assumed among all blocks and subgroups 




3. STL AXD TO TI\IES 
The STL time, t, is small enough to make the assumption that "no 
significant repair during STL .. a reasonable assumption. If the use1 · of 
these SE models 1,;ants to allo\.' for some repair during his STL time, then he 
might do so and still use these models b~• increasing the time To at \.'hich 
STL begins and redefining his STL time to be a fraction of his original STL 
time and compute the a\'ailability values in the equations using the 
increased value of T0 . 
4. C0~PrTATI0S OF AVAILABILITIES AXD RELIABILITIES 
The same methods an_d data used to comp ute operational a\'ailability. 
reliability. failure rate. MTBF and MTTR \'a)ues in the 0P-O3 Material 
Readiness Assessment Reports '-'ill be used to compute the corresponding and 
similar values in this report. 
.5. LJ\'h:AGE BET\.'EE\' SYSTE\I DEC.RAD..\TJ0'\ STATES A\'D MlSSILE C0\I\IA\'DS 
AT L..\r~CH 
It is assumed that all degradations in the accuracy of the seven 
Missile Commands At Launch can be quantified in some manner for all six 
degradated states S2 1 •.•• S7 by personnel at l'\S\i'C-PHD or some othe1· 
activity. This degradation in accuracy can be specified by specific error 
values or by ranges of error values \.'ith or '-'ithout some probability 
distribution over the given range . 
:;2 
APPENDIX F. SYSTEM CASUALTY - COMPONENT FAILUJ.E LINKAGE 
_ .. - - ---. 
Each system state can be related to specific component 
failures throughout the system. Some component failures may 
result in different system states , depending on the severity 
of the failure. For instance, the SOP component failures that 
result in fault code 106 (S3), could also result in total 
failure of the SDP (S7). It is hoped that the technical 
community can provide relative rates of failures for these 
components where multiple system states may result. 
Additionally, it is hoped the technical community can link 
system degregations to specific components within the 
reliability block. 
System State 1: All up. 
Result : System operates normally 
Effect : N/A 
cause: N/A 
System State 2: Al l up except fault code 100: transmitter 
power output degraded. 
Result: Two direc~or ship: Loss of one director. 
One director ship : Reduced target acquisition 
range and ability to track properly. Less 
reflected energy from the target could reduce 





Effect: No effect on missile inputs 
Cause: Critical casualty in reliability block 0011: 
Amp Oscillator Radiate or block 0017: Static 
Frequency Converter Radiate. 
System State 3: All up except fault code 106: SOP range 
signal degraded. 
Result: Two director ship: Loss of one director. 
one director ship: Range signal is not 
accurate from the SDP. 
Effect: Greater variance of the range at launch input 
to the missile. 
Cause: Critical failure in reliability block 0004: 
SDP. 
System State 4: All up except fault code 112: range deviation 
too large. 
Result: Two director ship: Loss of one di~ector. 
One director ship: Range tracking deviation 
is between 6 and 15 percent of range. 
Effect: Greater range at launch deviation. 
Cause: Critical Casualty in reliability block 0007: 
Receiver, 0011: Amp Oscillator Radiate, 0014: 
Control Monitor Radiate, or 0017: Static 
Frequency Converter Radiate . 
System State 5: All up except :or FOC/ ~SC which has on:i 
,:-? 
power sufficient to assign, tune and fire 
missiles in a normal manner. 
Result . Ability of operator/s to positively influence 
engagement is reduced. 
Effect : Minimal in non-ECM environment, possibly 
greater acquisition times/increased 
possibility of misfire . 
Cause: Critical casualties in the following 
components in reliability blocks 0003: FCC 
and 0005: RSC. This list is by no means 
exhaustive and additional consultation with 
PHD NSWC will be required to further refine . 
FOC: 














Train/Eleva t ion Indicators 
Indicator Status Panel 
Engageable indicator 
35/100 VDC Power Supply 
Diodes 
Joystick Antenna Control 
Lamp Dimmer Assembly 
TV Enable indicator switch 







System State 6: All up except SDP or receiver: slaved 
illuminator or LLLTV mode (S!/LLLTV) 
Result: Two director ship: Loss of one director. 
One director ship: Acquisition and tracking 
must be done by an external source with 
reliable elevation data (Not TAS). If ship is 
not equipped with a 3-D radar, there is a TAS 
computer failure, or the 3-D radar is unable 
to track the target, LLLTV mode must be 
utilized . 
Effect: SI: Greater variation in range at launch and 
simdoppler inputs, Less accurate tracking. 
LLLTV: Range at launch, simdoppler, and 
superelevation defaults utilized. Reduced 
detection ranges, and greater effects from 
environmental factors. 
Cause: Critical casualty in Reliability Block 0004: 
SD? or Reliability Block 0007: Receiver. 
System State 7: All up except computer or SDC: computer 
complex casualty mode. 
Result: Computer and SDC are bypassed. External 
designation not available. Ship's motion 
is attributed to the target in the vertical 
plane. 
Ef:ect: Greater variation i~ t~e range at launch a~ci 
Simdopp:e!." inputs ':.o t:ie mlss:.:e. launc!'le::-
F4 
Superelevation is set at 15 degrees over 
director elevation. 
Cause : Critical casualty in Reliability Block 0001 : 
Computer or Reliability Block 0002 : Signal 
Data Converter. 
Reliability block 1001: Guided Missile Launche~ plays an 
important role in all states. In terms of systems 
effectiveness , the following components will effect only the 
probability of launch. 
20A2 and 20A3: Side specific, wil l only effect at most 4 
missiles in the launche~. 







APPENDIX G. LIST OF PARAKETERS 
One type of parameter in this report is used to help define the 
equations or meanings of the models. They are the following: 
a) Search-through-launch (STL) time, t. 
b) Deployment time, r0 , at start of engagement scenario. 
c) For each system state Sj, the identification of the affected blocks 
~hose failures result in system degradation state Sj. The 
reliabilit~· equation for the "failure event'" that results in this 
degradation needs to be \.:ritten do\.·n so thAt the MTTF of this 
••failure e\'ent"' can be computed using MTTF = J~ RS(t)dt. 
d) Special configurations of the EDS ~ith the NSS~S that may restrict 
the meaning of any of the equations may need to be identified. 
e) The <'rror or rouge uf ,;ri·ors fc,r l!ach of the seven Missile Commands 
At Launch for each uf tl1c six t.legraded systP.m states s2 ! •••• S7. 
The otl1e1· parameters needed tu implement these SE model!> are the 
pa1·ameter ,·alues needed to run the digital computer six DOF guidance 
simulations. These parameter values are 
a) target range at time of launch . 
b) Missile Commands At Time of Launch. 
c) MARK MOD and build of ~ATO Seasparrow Missile and any other 
Seasparrow missile specifics needed to run the simulations. 
d) Target missile specification 
1) cross section 
2) closing speed 
3) altitude 
4) angle of approach 
G1 
5) ECM features (if appropriate) 
6) maneuverability (if appropriate) 
7) range. 
A listing of target missiles, NATO Seasparro~ missiles and ship 
configurations follo~s: 
TUR.EAT CANDIDATES 
1 . EXOCET 
2. SILK\.'OUI 
3. AS-4 
MISSILE CONFIGURATION CANDIDATES 
1. RIM-7M (Fl BtILD) 
2. RIM-7M (H BtILD) 
3. RHt-7P 
SnIP CONFIGURATION CANDIDATES 
1. ~SSMS M~ 57 MOD 2 (BLOC~ lR, SI~GLE DIRECTOR. D0963 CLASS) 
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